As people who have had a ‘good’ taste of bad war and familiar with its ugly outcome, Eritreans want to be optimistic and see the full implementation of the peace process including the border demarcation.
BY BRUH METSAE
Two decades after the eruption of full-fledged war between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the subsequent huge human and material loss that ensued both countries are today burying the hatchet and working in embracing and solidifying peace and reviving their badly needed economy.
Signs of Optimism
What makes the current peace process more unique, giving optimism to both the brotherly people of Eritrea and Ethiopia has largely to do with the bold move Ethiopian parliament undertaken in recent months, voting overwhelmingly for the acceptance of the Algiers peace agreement and reestablishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Another factor that adds to such optimism involves Somalia and Djibouti, two neighboring countries with a fair share of external-driven instability. As of current, three regional countries – Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia – have just signed a joint declaration of cooperation in trade, security, and other important matters. Djibouti has also shown a positive signal and will most likely to join the group in recent days to weeks.
Mixed Feelings
When President Isaias accepted Ethiopia’s call for engagement and announced to send a delegation to Addis Ababa on June 20 (Martyr’s day), people had exhibited a mixed feeling of joy and suspicion. Some people were simply confused, given the speed with which the rapprochement occurred. After all, up until recently, Ethiopia’s position towards Eritrea has not been palatable and antagonist, to say the least.
For over a decade following the unprovoked war of aggression which had consumed so many lives, the former did everything and anything in its power to undermine the latter’s sovereignty, calling for regime change, imposing unwarranted UN sanctions on a basis of falsified and fabricated Eritrea’s role with terrorism.
Given such facts, it’s quite natural for people to feel a sense of suspicion to such gesture for peace and take it with a grain of salt.
Why Peace and Why Now?
To have a better appreciation as to why and the speed with which such positive rapprochement occurred at this time, it’s prudent that one examines closely at some of the sociopolitical changes Ethiopia has been undergoing in recent years.
It’s the writers firm belief that people’s disenchantment over the ruling party EPRDF lack of governance, the gross human rights violations and the resultant sense of deep anger played a big role in the decision by some members within the ruling party EPRDF to take a different approach in reforming the country’s administrative system and resolving the Eritrea – Ethiopia conflict.
It’s a known fact that Ethiopia has for the past 25 years been ruled by the minority TPLF regime, whose members belong to the Tigray region. Since it came to power in 1991, after ousting another brutal regime- the Dergue militarily, the TPLF government has committed countless crimes against both its own citizens and its neighbors. It was accused by the international community of rigging multiple elections and imprisoning and torturing dissents who questioned the legality of the election.
Externally, the TPLF regime, supported by some powers, crafted the plan to invade Eritrea, only six years after both peoples enjoyed the peace and what appeared to be a lasting warm relationship, under a false territorial claim. Eritrean citizens who resided in Ethiopia for decades were harassed, humiliated and over 70 thousands of them, amongst whom include sick old people, pregnant women and children were deported to Eritrea inhumanely and with nothing but the clothes on their back.
To make things in the region worse, back in December 2006, the TPLF regime under the leadership of the now deceased Meles Zenawi, invaded another sovereign nation: Somalia using “terrorism” as a pretext; destroying families and leaving the country in a chaotic state.
Domestically, certain ethnic groups within Ethiopia were harshly treated and tortured by the same clique for voicing their dismay over the government’s territorial redistricting program they felt threatens their inherited cultures and the lack of economic progress in the country.
Ethnic tensions have risen to the highest level and reached a point that the government was unable to control it. People took it to the streets across Ethiopia demanding drastic sociopolitical changes. The country has suffered multiple incidences of civilian casualties as a result of clashes with TPLF ruled government forces. Ethiopia was on a verge of collapse.
The Era of New Hope
For most Ethiopians, the emergence of Dr. Abye as their Prime Minister at such critical time in their country was considered as “God sent”, which was largely the reason they galvanized huge support to his bold move to both unite his people and make peace with his neighbors.
With respect to Eritrea, the decision by Dr. Abiy and most members of the parliament to engage with their former foe in such a positive manner is of several folds. For one thing and the most important one deals with Ethiopia’s current political and economic state. Twenty years after the eruption of the deadly military conflict and the political and social pressure that followed persistently to isolate and destroy Eritrea, the government in Addis Ababa finally seems to have come to realize that engaging with Asmara with hostility is both meaningless and unproductive.
Despite some difficulties, the sanctions and all other political pressures imposed on Eritrea for over two decades bear little fruits. In contrast, the country was moving forward in developing its economy; the international community was opening up and appraising the progress underway. Eritrea has reached a point where it will move forward and thrive through its solid principle of self-reliance with or without Ethiopia.
Within such context, PM Abiy and his colleagues come to terms and reached out to Eritrea believing that doing so would also benefit their country to come out of the sad economic state it’s in.
Ethiopia’s state of the economy has suffered significantly in the past decade. Corruption played a big part in draining the country’s economy. Billions of dollars have admittedly been stolen by top government officials.
Civil unrest which persisted for years also has contributed to deepening the country’s economic crisis. In addition, lack of hard currency made it more difficult for the government to import goods and services, including its capacity to pay the huge port fees.
What makes the current fanfare between the two countries rather unique and historically relevant is that this would be the first time (and hopefully not the last ) in Ethiopia’s history where the country’s leader not only recognized Eritrea’s sovereignty but also called for a comprehensive peace that would have a far-reaching benefit for both people.
Such language of peace and reconciliation on the basis of mutual respect was an alien to all the previous leaders, all of whom ruled their people by the barrel of a gun and died by one. This may be one factor that instilled hope and optimism in both peoples who had quenched for peace for over two decades and wanted to see the end of hatred and hostility.
A Misreading Tendency
As Eritreans who have been victimized by the previous successive Ethiopian rulers for decades, the need to approach the current peace deals cautiously is quite natural. And I think we should.
Besides, making repeated mistakes don’t look good on us. Having said that, looking at all things we face in life in an apprehensive way persistently without making a thorough analysis is counterproductive. There comes a time when we have to open up to ideas and plans that are of benefit to our society even if they seem too good to be true, and provide moral support in its implementation.
Some of the pessimistic comments that hovered around on social media shortly after both Eritrea and Ethiopia accepted the peace plan have created a tremendous state of confusion and suspicion. “He sold Asab!, that was his plan all alone” … “ What about border demarcation?” are amongst such comments that unfortunately attempted to convince the most gullible.
The irony is that the majority of the commentators and “Facebook warriors” who campaigned against the peace initiative profusely were the same ones who told us that the border issue is “none of our concerns” and frequently traveled to Awasa and Mekele to assist TPLF’s evil scheme in undermining Eritrean sovereignty.
There are also remnants of Emperor Menelik and Haileselassie, who, to this day, daydream of owning Eritrea, including its vast Red Sea and its ports. For these few chauvinists, the peace initiative was miscalculated as to mean “Union” with Ethiopia, far from the truth. They were seen on social media tampering with our map and our flag. The likes of the die-hard Teddy Afro and Tamagn Beyene who still live in the 18th century Lala land will continue to salivate over Eritrea but won’t bear any fruit. Because, despite the presence of such backward tendency amongst some Ethiopian elites and descendants of the Emperors, the majority of Ethiopian people have shown strong desire to live in peace with Eritreans as good neighbors.
Moving Forward
Only God knows how things will unfold between the two countries in the future. As people who have had a ‘good’ taste of bad war and familiar with its ugly outcome, we want to be optimistic and see the full implementation of the peace process including the border demarcation.
One also would hope that realization of peace and stability in the region will create an environment conducive to concentrate on the yet to be resolved domestic matters.
“This is a further agreement helping to cement the positive relations between them” – UN
U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and African Union Commission Chairman Moussa Faki will witness the peace summit between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Jeddah. The summit also points to an emerging partnership between the Horn of Africa and the Gulf states based on mutual respect, mutual benefit and complementarity.
Eritrea and Ethiopia will attend a summit in Saudi Arabia on Sunday to sign an agreement cementing the thaw between the two former Horn of Africa enemies, a UN spokesman said on Friday.
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman will host the signing ceremony in Jeddah to be attended by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and African Union Commission chairman Moussa Faki Mahamat.
UN spokesman Farhan Haq did not provide details, saying the Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders would sign a “further agreement helping to cement the positive relations between them.”
On Tuesday, the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea reopened two land border crossing points for the first time in 20 years, clearing the way for trade between the two nations.
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritreas President Isaias Afwerki signed a declaration of peace in July that formally ended two decades of hostility.
Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in the early 1990s, and war broke out later that decade over a border dispute.
A 2002 UN-backed boundary demarcation was meant to settle the dispute for good, but Ethiopia refused to abide by it.
A turnaround began in June when Abiy announced that Ethiopia would hand back to Eritrea the disputed areas including the flashpoint town of Badme where the first shots of the border war were fired.
If the Port of Assab fuel storage and unloading facility is in good condition Ethiopian Petroleum Supply Enterprise (EPSE) may import up to 30 percent of the total fuel import via Assab in 2019.
Following the landmark peace declaration between Ethiopia and Eritrea the Ethiopian Petroleum Supply Enterprise (EPSE) is looking at the Port of Assab for fuel import.
Reliable sources told The Reporter that EPSE is planning to import some amount of the country’s fuel import through the Port of Assab as of 2019.
Sources said a team of experts drawn from the enterprise, the Ethiopian Roads Authority, the National Bank of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Roads Authority, and the Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise are assessing the port facilities.
The national committee will travel to Assab next week to make assessment.
“We will look at the berth, fuel tanker and unloading facility at the port. If things look good EPSE may start importing fuel via the Port of Assab as of January 2019,” sources told The Reporter.
So far EPSE has been using the Port of Djibouti to import 95 percent its fuel purchase. The Horizon Djibouti Petroleum Terminal provides storage facility to the enterprise. However, the Horizon Terminal is not expanding the storage facility to cope up with the growing fuel import by Ethiopia. All the military bases in Djibouti also use the same facility. Hence the terminal is unable to meet the growing demand.
“If the Port of Assab fuel storage and unloading facility is in good condition EPSE may import up to 30 percent of the total fuel import via Assab in 2019. This will be decided after the field visit,” sources said.
“Djibouti Fuel Terminal is still intact and we will keep using the Horizon terminal but if we can import some amount of our fuel via Assab we can relieve the congestion at Horizon Terminal,” they added.
The Djibouti Horizon Fuel terminal tank farm has a total of 31 tanks with a storage capacity of 300,000cu.m of petroleum products. The terminal has various tanks for gasoline (benzene), gas oil (diesel), kerosene and jet fuel. DHT Company has allocated half of the tank farm more than 150,000cu.m of petroleum storage capacity for Ethiopia. EPSE uses the facility to store 72,000cu.m of diesel, 70,000cu.m jet fuel, gasoline 10,000cu.m and 10,000cum fuel oil.
Ethiopian fuel import has been growing at a rate of 10 percent every year and reached three million metric tons valued at three billion dollars. The country’s daily average consumption is diesel 80,000 cu. M (8 million liter), benzene (gasoline) 1,600cu.m (1.6 million liter), jet fuel 2,500cu.m (2.5 million liter). EPSE pays two million dollars for Horizon Terminal for the storage facility.
EPSE estimates that the country would need 2,780,000 metric tons of gasoil, 840,000 metric tons of jet fuel, 494,000 metric tons of gasoline and 83,000 metric tons of fuel oil in 2019. The country’s total fuel demand in 2019 is estimated at 4,197,000 metric tons valued at 2.8-3 billion dollars.
EPSE will float a fuel procurement tender end of this month that will cover 2019 petroleum demand of the country. Sources told The Reporter that before putting up the fuel tender the enterprise should pass a decision on the use of the Assab port.
“Because the bidders should know which port they would use to deliver the petroleum products,” they added.
Full text of the Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea signed in Jeddah, also known as the Jeddah Peace Agreement.
The Seven Article Jeddah Peace Agreement signed between the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia on the 16th of September 2018 before King Salman bin Abdul Aziz of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in the presence of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in Jeddah, is, therefore, the Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea hereinafter referred to as the Two Parties;
Considering the close bonds of geography, history, culture, and religion between the two countries and their peoples;
Respecting each other’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity;
Desiring to achieve lasting peace and cement their historical ties to achieve their lofty objectives;
Determined to establish comprehensive cooperation on the basis of complementarity and synergy;
Determined further to contribute actively to regional and global peace and security;
Reaffirming the Joint Declaration on Peace and Friendship that they signed on July 9, 2018, in Asmara;
Reiterating their commitment to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations;
The Two Parties agree as follows;-
Article One
The state of war between the two countries has ended and a new era of peace, friendship and comprehensive cooperation has started.
Article Two
The two countries will promote comprehensive cooperation in the political, security, defense, economic, trade, investment, cultural and social fields on the basis of complementarity and synergy.
Article Three
The two countries will develop Joint Investment Projects, including the establishment of Joint Special Economic Zones.
Article Four
The two countries will implement the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission decision.
Article Five
The two countries will promote regional and global peace, security and cooperation.
Article Six
The two countries will combat terrorism as well as trafficking in people, arms and drugs in accordance with international covenants and conventions.
Article Seven
The two countries will establish a High-Level Joint Committee, as well as Sub-committees as required, to guide and oversee the implementation of this Agreement. This Agreement is made at Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on this day of September 16, 2018, in two original copies in Amharic, Tigrinya, Arabic and English languages; in case of discrepancy in interpretation, the English version shall prevail.
The following Security Council press statement was issued by Ambassador Nikki Haley under her capacity as President of the UN Security Council for the month of September.
The members of the Security Council welcomed the Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperationsigned by the President of the State of Eritrea and the Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on 16 September 2018, in Jeddah and expressed appreciation to the role played by His Majesty King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, and by the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in facilitating this agreement.
They took note of the commitment of the two countries to open a new era of peace, friendship and comprehensive cooperation as well as promote regional peace and security.
The members of the Security Council also welcomed the meeting between the President of Djibouti and the President of Eritrea on 17 September 2018, in Jeddah, under the auspices of His Majesty King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia.
The members of the Security Council express hope that this meeting will open a new chapter in the relations between Djibouti and Eritrea and encourage the two countries to continue to engage in meaningful dialogue.
The members of the Security Council noted that these developments represent a historic and significant milestone with far-reaching positive consequences for the Horn of Africa and beyond.
They commended the leaders of the region for their wisdom and courage in their continued effort to resolve disputes and call upon them to sustain these recent efforts and gains with a view to opening a new chapter of cooperation thereby ensuring greater peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.
In this regard, the members of the Security Council stand ready to support countries of the region in their endeavors.
“Relations between [Eritrea and Djibouti] have remained cold for the past decade, but now we have entered the normalization phase thanks to the help of our brothers in Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region” – President Ismail Omar Guelleh
President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh said that Saudi Arabia has assumed a vital role to normalize the relations between his country and Eritrea and to create a serious desire to reach a final settlement of the differences between the two countries.
He stressed that such an endeavor was aimed at promoting peace, stability, and development at the bilateral and regional levels.
In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Guelleh expressed optimism at the future of relations between Djibouti and Eritrea, also noting that the Eritrean-Ethiopian agreement, sponsored by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz in Jeddah, was the basis for the establishment of a comprehensive and lasting peace between the two countries.
“We welcomed this agreement, which constitutes an appropriate basis for the establishment of a comprehensive and lasting peace between the two countries and turns the page of long hostility between them. We support and commend the initiative of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz in this regard,” the president said.
“We also affirmed that this generous initiative was not only a commitment by Saudi Arabia to promote peace and stability in the Horn of Africa, but also to reach a lasting peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea with an international blessing, which confirms that the Kingdom is one of the pillars of peace, security, and stability in the region and the world,” he added.
Asked about the future of the relations between Djibouti and Eritrea, Guelleh said:
“Relations between the two countries have remained cold for the past decade, but now we have entered the normalization phase thanks to the help of our brothers in Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region.”
He emphasized in this regard the presence of “goodwill and a serious desire to reach a final settlement to the dispute between the two countries, which would lead to greater peace, stability, and development in both countries and the region.”
As for the relations between Saudi Arabia and Djibouti, Guelleh underlined the continuous collaboration at all levels, in addition to the presence of joint mechanisms for activating bilateral cooperation, “such as the Joint Saudi-Djibouti Committee, which represents a general framework for bilateral cooperation between the two countries in various fields and the Joint Business Council, which includes a group of businessmen in both countries.”
“Despite the chaos and confusion in our world, I see winds of hope blowing around the globe. Just days ago, I witnessed the signing of a historic peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Saudi Arabia” – UN Chief Antonio Guterres at UNGA
World leaders gather in New York this week to tackle a plethora of global problems, from climate change and migration to humanitarian disasters and war. Amid all these challenges, there is at least one positive note: The Horn of Africa’s swift and crucial diplomatic turnaround.
After decades of hostility and rivalry, a recent thaw in relations between nations in the region have shocked observers and brought hope for long-term peace. In June, Ethiopia and Eritrea ceased decades-long hostilities, agreed to reopen borders and embassies and resumed flights between their capitals. The following month, Eritrea and Somalia restored relations, after nearly 15 years of animosity with Mogadishu accusing Asmara of funneling money to insurgents.
On Sept. 11, Eritrea followed suit by signing an accord with Djibouti after more than a decade of border disputes over the Dumeira mountain and Dumeira island along the Red Sea. The next day, South Sudan’s warring leaders gathered in Addis Ababa and signed a deal to end the brutal five-year war that has ravaged the world’s youngest nation.
A historic “wind of hope” is blowing in the Horn of Africa, United Nations secretary general António Guterres recently said, adding the rapprochement represents a significant moment for global peace.
The Abiy effect
Changes in the region were precipitated by Ethiopia’s election of Abiy Ahmed Ali, a 42-year-old former minister with a doctorate in conflict resolution. Abiy, a member of the country’s Oromo community, was picked to head the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition after years of anti-government protests led by his own people. The Oromo, along with the Amhara, had agitated against the Tigray-dominated government, demanding land reform, full political participation, and an end to human rights abuses.
Abiy’s ascension as Africa’s youngest leader was also predicated on the resignation of premier Hailemariam Desalegn, who left in February to pave the way for “sustainable peace and democracy.”
Abiy didn’t disappoint. After taking over, he immediately ended an internet blackout, released journalists and critics, engaged exiled opposition groups, closed notorious prisons, and promised to open up the economy.
He also reached out to long-time foe Eritrea, saying Ethiopia will fully accept the terms of an agreement signed in 2000 which ended the war between the two nations over a disputed border. He also cooled tense relations with Egypt over sharing the Nile waters, flew to Mogadishu to solidify bilateral and trade relations, and oversaw the first meeting in two years between South Sudanese president Salva Kiir and his arch-rival, Riek Machar.
By breaking with the past, Abiy “ushered in a new administration that has prioritized regional integration, and provided an opportunity to pursue new relationships without the legacy of historical baggage,” says Omar Mahmood, a researcher with the Institute for Security Studies in Addis Ababa.
The (growing) role of Saudi Arabia and the UAE
The second important shift in relations was also the result of back-channel talks facilitated by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between Ethiopia and Eritrea, says Jason Mosley, a research associate at the African Studies Center at Oxford University. The two nations are leading the military coalition prosecuting the war in Yemen, and have pushed their presence in the Horn to counter Iranian influence.
Mosely says “the increasingly proactive and robust security posture” was heightened following the Qatar-Gulf crisis that began last year. The Saudi-UAE breakthrough in the region has, however, raised concerns of a new scramble in a geostrategic region already packed with competing global powers.
Guaranteeing success
The policy shifts are now set to create a conducive moment for economic cooperation in the region. With over 100 million people, landlocked Ethiopia has one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. Djibouti and Somalia are both located at a critical corridor for international shipping while Eritrea’s Red Sea coast has untapped oil and gas reserves.
Mahmood says Ethiopia’s bet on manufacturing and exports could be a good spring-board to guarantee the peace deals’ success in the long run. “There is a clear strategy behind the pursuit of economic integration, which should, in turn, reduce the prospect of political competition in the Horn.”
Fatal attacks in Addis Ababa area represent only the tip of recent violence, as local disputes flare during transition, and an ideological struggle heats up. (Photo source: Al Jazeera)
Between two popular celebratory rallies by contrasting opposition movements, Ethiopia’s deadly communal violence spread to the heart of the federation, shocking Addis Ababa, and fueling recriminations.
Local competition over resources and representation, as well an ethnically charged ideological struggle over the federal system, present major challenges for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed as he encourages all peaceful parties to participate in a newly open political environment.
On Sep. 13, as residents rigged up Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) flags in preparation for the return to Ethiopia of the group’s main faction two days later, individuals from the Oromo and Dorze ethnicities fought in and around Burayu, a town in Oromia state near the northwest boundary of Addis Ababa, the federal capital.
That presaged violence in the Addis Ababa area over the next three days, including the killing of at least 55 people. The events quickly attracted multiple competing narratives. Victims from Southern communities reported killings by Oromo, some residents of Burayu said Oromo were attacked, and the authorities blamed unspecified organized groups.
City police said on Monday that 14 people were killed in Kolfe, five in Addis Ketema, one in Arada, three in Lafto and five in Kirkos districts of Addis Ababa, while the federal government said 27 were killed in Burayu.
Violence unfolded after altercations in northwestern Addis Ababa on Sep. 12 when locals objected to OLF colors. Dorze attacked people putting up the flag the next day in Keta, leading to two Oromo deaths, said Henok Teshome, who lives there. The fighting expanded to other areas near Burayu on Sep. 14. “What we know is that many people were killed from both sides,” Henok said. A group from Addis Ababa then attacked Burayu on Sep. 15, he said.
As reports seeped out, angry crowds gathered in central Addis Ababa on Sep. 17, with many blaming OLF supporters. “We demand justice, our innocent brothers and sisters were killed,” said Yonas Kefiyalewu, a demonstrator. This was the third large gathering in Addis Ababa after the OLF rally and the Sep. 9 return of former mayor-elect and leader of Ginbot 7 Berhanu Nega. While there were disturbances in advance of the OLF gathering, both events, organized by groups formerly designated as terrorist, were peaceful.
On Sep. 17, after accusations of a negligent response to the disorder, authorities shot dead seven protesters in Addis Ababa, saying five were trying to snatch police guns. Mobile Internet networks were down for two days from Sep. 17 and initially around 300 people were arrested in the city and 400 in Burayu. Yesterday, police said more than 3,000 people have been detained for unrest and petty crimes such as gambling, with 1,200 taken to Tolay camp for remedial training.
Amnesty International condemned the government for using lethal force and mass arbitrary arrests. On Sep. 17 it said that OLF supporters attacked non-Oromos and added:
“Social media was awash with hate speech against non-Oromo groups in the three days preceding the rally. However, the security forces did nothing to stop the incitement to violence, or to protect targeted communities despite their repeated pleas for help.”
Amnesty said in an email that the hate speech included activist Tsegaye Ararrsa accusing ethnic Gurage of throwing stones at Oromo. Tsegaye didn’t respond to two emailed requests for comment. Other social media users were accused of making derogatory remarks about the Gamo, of which the Dorze are a sub-group.
Capital Crimes
Addis Ababa’s protesters shared Amnesty’s concerns about the attacks and police inaction. Some argued that rampages went unchecked because of official unwillingness to act against Oromo youths. The government corroborated suspicions of negligence by arresting security officials for lapses.
The chaos overshadowed the return of the OLF faction, which is headed by Dawud Ibsa and was based in Eritrea. The insurgency formed in 1973 to fight for Oromo independence and was loosely allied with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the struggle against the Derg. But during the transitional government from 1991 to 1995 the two liberation fronts fell out and the TPLF militarily routed the OLF. Meanwhile, the TPLF had nurtured Abiy’s party to govern Oromia instead of the OLF.
OLF is the founding father of the Oromo struggle
“OLF is the founding father of the Oromo struggle, dealing with the inhuman mass killings and injustices Oromo have been facing. So we are here to welcome our father,” Chemeda Bokora from Harar said at the OLF rally.
Following its sidelining, the OLF factionalized and conducted low intensity insurgencies, which weakened further in recent years. The Oromia and federal governments jailed many thousands of Oromo for alleged OLF activity over the last two decades. The group now wants its armed wing to become part of Oromia’s security apparatus, is willing to work with Oromo parties and seek allies in other states, and stands for ethnic self-determination, spokesman Tolera Adeba said in a Sep. 12 interview.
The constitutional right to self-determination including secession is opposed by parties that reject ethno-nationalism, including Ginbot 7, which recently split from Patriotic Front. Ginbot 7, which was also Eritrea-based and ran a low intensity insurgency, wants a restructured federation that is not based around ethno-linguistic identity, according to Ephrem Madebo, head of political affairs.
“Instead of creating a federal unit based on language, why not see their development potential? Why not see the population size?” he said. When pressed for a hypothetical example in the case of Amhara, the second-most populous region after Oromia, he said: “Based on those weighted criteria, Amhara could be broken into three or four.”
That type of thinking about the federation is anathema to Oromia’s governing party, the rest of the ruling front, and also to the Oromo opposition, including the OLF. “The objective of G7 is to divide Oromia, to dismember Oromia,” OLF Central Committee member Kajela Mardasa said on Sep.12.
Instead of creating a federal unit based on language, why not see their development potential
Regional leaders across Ethiopia have clear reasons for opposing the break-up of states, and such changes may well cause violent disputes, as there have been recently over contested areas, such as Gedeo-West Guji, Wolkait in Tigray, Qemant in Amhara, Konso in Southern Nations, and the Somali-Oromo borderlands. From a population of approximately 105 million, 1.1 million Ethiopians are currently displaced due to conflict, according to the UN.
In addition to maintaining regional integrity, the OLF wants Oromia to govern the city they call Finfinnee, which is also the capital of Oromia. The constitution says Addis Ababa’s autonomous city administration is responsible to the federal government. It called for Oromia’s “special interest” in the city to be determined by law.
The political liberalization overseen by Abiy has occurred after Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) rule was rocked by more than three years of youthful Oromo protests over marginalization and authoritarianism. The cause célèbre was a plan for the integrated development of the capital and surrounding areas of Oromia. Activists said it was a blueprint for more annexation and exploitation of Oromo land.
Burayu was one of the rapidly growing Oromo towns targeted by strategic planners and occasionally endured strikes and protests. It also faces severe political, economic and social pressures. Its population leapt from around 10,000 in 1994 to an estimated 150,000 two decades later, as people, including many from the Southern Nations, migrated from the countryside looking for work, and Addis Ababa residents pushed outwards seeking cheaper housing. In 2012, more than half of residences were informal, as Burayu’s land agency failed to deal with the demand, according to a 2014 paper by academics from Ethiopian Civil Service University.
Contestation over Addis Ababa and its environs is set to be part of the next political struggle in Ethiopia in the run-up to elections for the city council next year and national polls in 2020. “We claim Finfinnee. It is part of Oromia. The federal government can choose as a seat, but never claim Finfinnee as their home,” Tolera said. In a subsequently deleted Tweet, a new Amhara nationalist party said [now deleted] Addis Ababa will always be the “eternal city” of their community.
Blame Game
The violence in Burayu and other areas was preceded by skirmishes in Addis Ababa and a war of words. For example, the statue of Emperor Menelik II, the Shewan king who founded the city in 1886, is a flashpoint, as Oromo activists portray him as a colonizer.
An attendee at the OLF rally, Masresha Kumsa, said Menelik II expropriated Oromo land using modern weaponry obtained from Europe “in the name of Christianity.” The OLF and four Oromo parties said yesterday that the Ginbot 7-linked ESAT satellite channel had falsely framed OLF supporters.
Leading campaigner and Oromia Media Network boss Jawar Mohammed said those instigating violence wanted to dismantle the federal system, as opponents accused him of inciting communal attacks. The National Movement of Amhara said today the Oromo parties’ statement was a continuation of “Expansionist Nationalism.”
Hawassa is under stress from rapid growth
The blame game recalls the past government pattern of labeling political opponents as Ginbot 7 or OLF activists, and also echoes similar dynamics after recent unrest elsewhere.
For example, on Sep. 4 the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement accused the OLF and Oromos of being behind fatal violence in Benishangul-Gumuz, including the killing of three non-Oromo bus passengers in June, and riots in the state capital, Asosa. Outsiders aggravated protests in the city over the bus attack, with ethnic Berta and Amhara targeted, said Omer Ahmed, an Asosa businessman. Violence also flared this month in the northwestern state.
A year before the Derg regime finally collapsed in 1991, the OLF occupied Asosa. But this time, the OLF and Oromia government said Oromos were attacked in Benishangul-Gumuz, with the media mouthpiece of the former blaming TPLF for stoking ethnic violence on Oromia’s borders.
Similar allegations, which also have not been substantiated, were made against the TPLF when Sidama killed ethnic Wolayta in June in Hawassa amid a renewed push for Sidama statehood. Abiy blamed “daylight hyenas” for the disorder in the Southern Nations capital, but as with Burayu, and many other urban areas, Hawassa is under stress from rapid growth. Even if fanned by political entrepreneurs, an accelerated influx of Sidama into Hawassa—from 10 percent in 1994 to almost half the population by 2007—had already raised the political temperature.
The TPLF, which was the most powerful party in the EPRDF and largely controlled the security services, has lost federal power since Abiy’s arrival. Elements of the military and Tigray’s ruling party are thought to have backed Abdi Iley, the authoritarian ruler of Somali region. TPLF politburo member Getachew Assefa, the former intelligence chief removed by Abiy, are said to have tried to rein Abdi in, according to sources close to the security sector.
Abdi was replaced after a federal military intervention last month, which generated fatal attacks on non-Somali residents of state capital, Jijiga. As well as being victims of atrocities committed by Abdi’s clan-based paramilitary force, such as an Aug. 14 attack in Mayu Muluke district, Oromo have killed Somalis in a protracted conflict.
Early post-Derg years also saw a surge in ethnic conflicts in the south
An Oromo militia reportedly killed civilians around Moyale in July, while more than 500,000 Gedeo people suffered displacement this year from fighting with Oromo from West Guji Zone. Territorial contestation in the area has roots in the late 19th century amid Menelik II’s expansion. Tensions increased in the 1960s after a Gedeo rebellion against feudal landlords and resettlements onto predominantly Guji land. Conflict then occurred twice in the 1990s after a contentious referendum over disputed areas.
In addition to the unrest in Sidama and Gedeo, 16 people were killed in three locations in Southern Nations in July and August, according to the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (HRCO). August violence in Tepi that killed five people stems from the Sheko people’s desire for political autonomy, HRCO said.
Early post-Derg years also saw a surge in ethnic conflicts in the south. Commentator René Lefort thinks recent unrest nationwide is partly explained by a fragmenting sub-federal security apparatus amid weakening central authority.
Same Game?
After the disorder spread to Addis Ababa’s environs, accusations were leveled not only against Oromo activists for incitement, but also against Ginbot 7 for orchestrating the attacks. One theory claimed a letter requesting a demonstration in Southern Nations city Arba Minch on Sep. 14 shows there was a plan to provoke Oromo to attack southern communities, as the letter was sent before attacks occurred.
“This is absolutely false and a recklessly cynical conspiracy theory intended to drive a wedge between Oromo organizations and G7,” said Neamin Zeleke, Ginbot 7’s deputy head of political affairs, about accusations against the movement. Federal Police Commissioner Zeynu Jemal promoted the Arba Minch letter theory without blaming G7, and said there was an attempt to provoke conflict between the movement and OLF. HRCO said fighting began in Burayu on Sep. 12.
Zeynu, Oromia Chief Administrator Lemma Megersa, Oromia spokesman Negeri Lencho, head of Burayu security office Solomon Tadesse, and the OLF’s Tolera said unspecified groups working against reforms organized the violence. “Those who hate OLF and those who don’t want Oromo people’s right to be fulfilled are the ones that created this and they are those multiplying it,” Tolera said on Sep. 23. Oromo activist Solomon Ungashe and others openly accused Ginbot 7, and several of its members have been arrested.
Recently, Abiy has been focused on his own organization, which changed its name to the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) and voted younger firebrands and security officials, including new national domestic intelligence chief Demelash Gebremichael, onto the Central Committee at its Congress. The latter move reneges on a pledge to depoliticize the intelligence service by its new director.
In an opening speech, Abiy called for Oromo unity, suggesting two or three Oromo parties was sufficient, said destabilization to impede reform was futile, and promoted the generational Gadaa system as a solution for African democracy. “We passed through fire and brought today’s victory with struggle. The new generation has to transition to a higher level,” he said.
But the ODP faces a challenge in Oromia from the OLF—a renewed struggle which has already featured politicized violence in Kellem Wollega Zone before OLF decamped from Eritrea—and allied parties, just as the ruling coalition does in Addis Ababa from Ginbot 7, which has its own struggle brewing in Amhara.
If you look at the gulf separating various positions, things look very pessimistic
The country’s predicament was encapsulated on Sep. 14 by OLF co-founder Leenco Lata, who has also returned from exile as leader of yet another Oromo party. He said that problems caused by population growth would soon be out of control unless addressed, and acknowledged that fundamental disagreements existed between political camps.
“If you look at the gulf separating various positions, things look very pessimistic,” Leenco said. “On the other hand, Ethiopia’s challenges are massive, and if the political actors really feel responsible they have no choice but to negotiate a compromise, or else the alternative is a total breakdown of order.”
Nizar is the Addis Ababa correspondent for Bloomberg News and Ermias is an Ethiopia Insight reporter and administrator.
The Cabinet of Ministers held a meeting at State House today in the morning hours focusing on the object political developments in the region.
The Ministerial Cabinet held an extensive discussion on the scope and implication of the encouraging new political developments in the region following by the historic joint declaration of Friendship and Peace reached by Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as the broad influence of the prevailing comprehensive regional strategic partnership.
The Ministerial Cabinet also discussed on the programs of port rehabilitation and expansion, road infrastructure, energy, industrial set up and associated matters. Blueprints of the programs, including funding of the projects are being worked and scheduled to be finalized in three months time.
The Cabinet of Ministers reiterated the five pillars that govern the regional partnership including respect of each other’s sovereignty, an articulated framework of common interests, rejection of harmful extraneous agendas, conducive regional climate as well as sectors of synergy.
Regarding the existing internal situation and challenges encountered, President Isaias underlined on the need for integrated effort to confront any internal or external attempt to reverse the new developments emerging in the region.
Indicating that Eritrea has emerged victorious in the face of the past challenges, President Isaias said that the new era requires integrated effort for the benefit of the country and people.
The Cabinet Ministers conducted extensive discussion on strengthening the internal capacity to implement the setout development programs and concluded its half-day meeting.
The TPLF has used its phony ideology of “ethnic federalism” to create a perpetual disunion among the Ethiopian people by dividing and corralling them like cattle into insular nations and nationalities. Tigrayans along with the rest of the Ethiopian people, have to work jointly to frustrate the intrigues of the TPLF and march towards building a peaceful and a united country because they are masters of their own destiny.
BY I. HABTE
By virtue of being ‘liberators’ of Ethiopia, the TPLF ruled the country under the veneer of ‘democratic revolution’ and kept a tight control over the eight regions through the heavy hand of its agents including police and security forces. What is more, the representatives of the regions in the Executive Committee of the EPRDF and National Parliament of Ethiopia were true servants of the TPLF than their own region or people. Their unfailing loyalty and silence were indeed a benediction to the TPLF to plunder the wealth of the country, grab huge lands and implement policies or decisions that indulge Tigrai without any resistance from the representatives and other crimes, to say the least.
The death of Meles Zenawi cast a dark shadow over the TPLF’s power and influence. Its dominance under the pretext of ‘collective leadership’ started to be challenged by Oromo and Amhara main political parties. In addition, the eruption of ethnic uprising, which didn’t come out of the blue, quickly snowballed into all regions and became violent and uncontrollable, which finally led to the removal of the TPLF from power.
For this political change, thousands of Ethiopians made the ultimate sacrifice, jailed and tortured while many others fled the country to escape political persecution. ‘Whatever has a beginning has an end.’
Given this fact, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, the first Oromo has become the new PM of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia. His coming to power has ushered in a new era in Ethiopian politics. Besides, the new political change has given a strong impetus to all opposition political parties to come to the country and work together with the government to shake off turmoil and ensure stability and prosperity.
The TPLF sailed under false colours for 27 years; however, its removal from power has reared its ugly head.
When Ethiopians embark on a new path to bring about a real change in the country, the unscrupulous TPLF leaders started to sing a different song: to hell with Ethiopia if Meles’ doctrine is not followed or if the TPLF is not in power; it threatened Ethiopians with breaking away from the country by invoking Article 39; and, when they were in power, they ruled Ethiopia through ‘divide and rule, when they were driven out of power, they have started to ‘divide and destabilize’ the country.
Since 1975, the creation of an independent state of Tigrai has been on the TPLF’s bucket list. But, it thought that this dream could not be realized unless the country is being left in a state of confusion and chaos. To this end, it has designed a series of devious stratagems in order to pave the ground for the ultimate dream, wash its hands of crimes, crimes of humanity committed against the Ethiopians, shy away from accountability and run away from corruption, economic sabotage and money laundering charges which they have still got away with it. This clever political gambit of the TPLF is devised to throw dust in the people’s eyes.
Ethnic federalism or politics is a political minefield in Ethiopia. Because of this, the ethnic-based violence in the country could be seen against the backdrop of this policy. On the basis of this fact, the TPLF has sown discord or hatred, harbored mistrust and fester inter-ethnic conflict among different contending ethnic groups.
Over the past four years, Ethiopia has been hit by fierce ethnic uprisings which had been spinning out of control until the new PM came to power. The violence has been masterminded by the TPLF and implemented by its recruited agents including people placed in high government positions, military and security people, opportunists and others collaborators. So, it is not a stretch to say that the TPLF is a real trouble-maker in the true sense of the word and can never be a genuine and trustful political partner in Ethiopian politics.
Ethiopia has still been engulfed in the worst political crisis and ethnic unrest in several decades. As a result, the political chaos took a heavy toll on human lives, hampered slightly the ongoing reforms, negatively affected the slow economic growth and torn apart a number of economic infrastructures of the country.
In addition, thousands of innocent people killed and wounded; a number of government buildings and churches were destroyed in a fire with their properties and/or looted by rioters; over 1.5 million people displaced internally from their homes and are in dire need of immediate emergency support, to say nothing of the rehabilitation cost, which is not an easy task for a country that is struggling to revitalize its wrecked economy; and, the spirit of living together in peace and harmony among the different ethnic groups disrupted, to name just a few.
According to the TPLF visionaries, if the government is unable to deliver immediate emergency support to the displaced people and fail to ensure security and promote economic growth, the people’s anger and frustration against the government will mount and lead to further instability. For example, some religious leaders, politicians, and people aired their resentment over the government’s delay in handling the security problem in the Somali region of Ethiopia. The TPLF has been trading on the grievances and discontent of the people created by insecurity, lawlessness and economic problems to undermine the ongoing reforms, weaken the power of the government by subversive or terrorist acts, diminish its popularity and finally break away from Ethiopia as an end in itself.
The ethnic-hatred violence, directly or indirectly, has affected all Ethiopians though the degree of damage or causalities inflicted upon them vary from one ethnic group to another or from one region to another. The Tigrai people have suffered greatly by the uprising more than the other group, that is to say, that they have taken the full brunt of the consequences. Despite this, the other ethnic groups vented their anger and frustration on them. Of course, they were targeted not because of being Tigrians but they had fallen prey to the TPLF’s brutal rule. The retaliation taken against them is, therefore, not legally or morally acceptable since one should not be punished for the sins of others. When violence becomes a common outlet for anger and frustration and a way to achieve revenge, it not only results in harm to victims but also to the health of society.
The three most regions hit by ethnic violence were Oromo, Southern, and the Ethio-Somalis. In addition, hundreds of Amharas were threatened and driven out of Oromo and Benishangul Gumuz regions and returned to their home region.
Likewise, few hundreds of Tigrians were forced, threatened, intimidated or afraid of their life left many troubled regions and returned to Tigrai to escape ethnic-based violence. The returnees left their properties behind them and arrived at their respective regions with nothing more than the clothes on their backs and are still worse off for shelter, food and other necessities for life. In the meantime, there is no such resentment about any attacks on the Afar people from other ethnic groups.
Despite this fact, the old fogeys have been repeatedly touting ‘Threat against Tigrai’ rhetoric to stir up attention from their people. They are making a drama out of the ‘ethnic-based vitriolic attacks particularly on the people of Tigrai just to cover up sinister aspect. But, nothing could be further from the truth! The TPLF wouldn’t have been ranting about the attack on its people if it had set its mind on and looked into the constitution sincerely.
Creating instability to achieve one’s ambition is unrealistic or unlikely. In addition to this, the TPLF has designed another strategy geared towards drumming up support from the people living in and outside Tigrai to achieve its goal. To this end, it has launched a string of campaigns accompanied by deception, cheap lies, mendacious propaganda, exaggeration, and the likes.
The TPLF and its villainous accomplices are trying to take the people of Tigrai in with their political chicanery. Inside Tigrai, the TPLF has been engaged in carrying out intensive meetings, conferences, rallies, or interviews for the people to arouse the people’s ‘nationalism.’
Besides, they are making all-out efforts to isolate them from the other Ethiopians by stretching the truth of the ethnic-based attacks of all kinds on its people, disseminating dogged information, spreading doubts about the positive change underway in Ethiopia and trying to persuade them that the change is a real threat to Tigrai and its people. .
Since one deception makes way for another, the TPLF has been preying upon the people’s credulity and ignorance of the situation to take them down a dangerous road. The Tigrian Diaspora have been informed through its agents/spies, to stand by the Tigrai people and to stay vigilant for any future unknown happenings in the country. They are being warned to remain aloof from any meetings or gatherings organized by Ethiopian Diaspora other than that of promoting the ‘Tigrai First’vision.
The TPLF has spared no efforts to imbue the Tigrai communities with hatred and ethnic resentment. By perfidy means, it has been instilling non-existing fears, ‘fear of being a Tigrian and living with Ethiopia’ (or, fear of the “other”) in the minds of its people.
It should be noted that the TPLF leaders have been bragging about the contribution of Meles to ‘peace, unity and economic development’ to Ethiopia. The so-called ‘Meles vision’ is being disseminated through seminars and mass media to influence the young Tigrai generation and to etch his doctrine in their minds. They have been making great efforts to brand Meles as an icon of ‘Tigrai armed struggle’ and of ‘democracy and federalism’ in Ethiopia. They are arguing that ‘not supporting the TPLF constitutes betraying Meles,’ and trying to whitewash his crimes, which, one shouldn’t surprise, truly demonstrates honour among thieves
All but literally, Tigrai has become a ‘Punt Land’ of Ethiopia. Its leaders have openly defied policies, decision or orders of the Federal Government and slowed down their communication and relations with it since the new PM came to power. They have failed to cooperate with the government on security and other related matters and are working at cross purposes with other regions. They cling obstinately to ‘we have our own way’ mindset, so much so that they set to govern Tigrai according to their preferences and wishes. The chairperson of Tigrai region criticized the PM and other region leaders in barbed words on many occasions. In short, the region seems inaccessible to the Federal Government and becomes a stronghold for ‘wanted’ or other criminals, more or less like a ‘no-go area.’
It seems that ethnic federalism, which is blamed for the present crisis in the country, is still being sustained by many and carried on to the future rather than throwing it away due to its negative impact on the country. Most, unfortunately, there is no end to the TPLF legacy in sight. According to its engineers, each region has to look after its regions interests rather than considering the interests of others. In other words, each region is concerned more about its ethnic group’s benefits and strives hard to improve their well-being while leaving the unfortunate ones to their fate. It is every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost.
In all honesty, some regions could have more rich citizens, experts, scholars, local investors, vast fertile lands and other opportunities than other regions. The fortunate ones can harness and make good use of the region’s opportunities to improve the living standard of their inhabitants.
In general, this will widen the wealth disparities among the ethnic groups, develop strong ethnic nationalism rather than Ethiopian nationalism and deepen further the existing fissures among the ethnic groups. This endogenous driven potential threat could probably be a tinderbox for the unity of the country unless Ethiopians do something to prevent the way the country is heading for, then the dream of nation-building will be nothing more than chasing the rainbow.
It is true that the political chaos over the past four years together with other factors have aggravated the country’s economy as well as the living conditions of poor Ethiopians. As a result, millions of young Ethiopians have left their country to the Middle East, Africa, Europe and America for a better life. This economic hardship has affected more than just Ethiopians but also Tigrians. The 27 tumultuous years rule has exposed the TPLF to the cruel fact that millions of its people have been plunged into poverty, thousands fled the country to escape poverty and many others reduced to begging.
In short, poverty has become a byword in Ethiopia. Despite promising the earth, the TPLF has done nothing to improve the life of its people. When the ethnic fighting flared up and the people of Tigrai started to feel the heat of the conflict, oddly enough, the TPLF rushed to portray itself as a guardian of the Tigrai people.
The anti-reform forces led by the TPLF are dead-set to do everything possible to create havoc on the country, contain the course of the political reform and keep Ethiopia weak, unstable and disunited. Before the new PM came to power, the country was sinking into an abyss of violence and lawlessness. Since then, the new leadership has been tasked with introducing a number of political reforms, easing tension and containing the escalation of ethnic-based violence and restoring peace and stability. Though the people of Ethiopia have so far achieved a considerable success in lifting the country out of the current political quagmire and ensuring peace and sustainable economic development, they shouldn’t rest on its laurels since complete success over the anti-reformist is a long way off.
There is no getting around the fact that driving a wedge between the Tigrai and Ethiopian people is the same as trying to square the circle since both of them have lived together as one people and stood by each other in weal and woe since time immemorial. So, without digging the wounds of the past and regretting the missed opportunities, the Tigrai and Ethiopian people have to work jointly to frustrate the intrigues of the TPLF and march towards building a peaceful and a united country because they are masters of their own destiny.
So, it is high time especially for the Tigrai people to break with the shibboleth doctrine of the TPLF and join the reformist forces. Without a shred of doubt, if not today, then tomorrow, the old guards will hoist by their own petard. Along with this, the political opportunism, hegemonic tendencies and destabilization tactics of the TPLF will vanish into thin air.
Having said that, the security situation of the country is still highly uncertain and volatile and as a result, the country is hovering on the brink of civil war. To the dismay of peace-loving people of Ethiopia, after a hiatus of weeks of peace, fresh ethnic-based violencehas flared up again and escalated in many cities and towns of the country and killings, beatings, lootings and rape on ethnic-based has become the order of the day. In addition, thousands of people have also displaced from their homes.
Lawlessness has overshadowed the country after anti-reform forces organized hooligans or crime gangs to destabilize the country. These young people, who had paid a heavy price for the existing political changes, are playing right into the hands of the TPLF group they were protesting against. They have taken the law into their own hands and upset peace and security of the inhabitants which put the ongoing reform at risk. It goes without saying that the TPLF is always behind the violence through underhand dealings.
It is true that the government has made great headway in bringing about significant political changes in the country and gone to great lengths to defuse and prevent the escalation of ethnic conflict; but the fact remains that the success gained so far through huge sacrifice could slip away easily unless the government keeps forging ahead with its reform plans. No doubt of winning out in the end despite challenges lies ahead.
Needless to say, the TPLF is on its deathbed but will never give up easily and fight to the bitter end until it meets a sticky end. To avert the risk of further violence, all political parties should put aside their political agenda and reaffirm full and unremitting support to the government until they bring their enemies to their kneel.
Similarly, religious leaders, activists, scholars, elderly people, and other citizens should stand along the government to preserve the hard-won political reform and save the country from heading off into uncharted waters rather than wringing their hands about it.
Otherwise, leaving Ethiopia to sit on a powder keg may surely one day lead to unstoppable catastrophe. No interest will be served then, neither the people of Ethiopia nor the region as a whole.
Drawing on years of experience analyzing the EPRDF’s federal system, this writer explains why it is in grave danger, and outlines how to avoid a drift towards majoritarian rule and worsening instability.
After a long wait, the highly anticipated 11th Congress of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) opened today in Hawassa, the capital of the multi-ethnic Southern Nations state. This Congress cannot be dismissed as routine. It is deadly serious, as its outcome may well determine the future of Ethiopian politics and economic and foreign policy.
There are many possible trajectories for the ruling front after the three-day meeting, but signs of a dark future are prominent. The configuration of forces within the EPRDF may well change, but more importantly, the constitution and its consensus-based federative and parliamentary democracy are at risk.
Arguably of even greater import, the Congress may toll the death knell for the EPRDF’s Democratic Developmental State.
The Congress’ theme is “Let’s ensure the Ethiopian renaissance by upholding changes within the Developmental Democracy Framework.”
Until recently, the Democratic Developmental State had been the EPRDF’s ideological anchor. The change in emphasis from ‘Democratic Developmental’ to ‘Developmental Democracy’ suggests the EPRDF could mutate from a Development-centric to a Democratic-centric ideology. Ostensibly superficial, these semantic could be the wind in the sails of change, as can also be seen in the ‘democratic’ name changes of the Amhara and Oromia parties.
Such alterations could mean an extended, increasingly volatile political transition, and a loss of economic momentum at a crucial stage of development.
A Powerful Front or Hollow Shell?
In 2007 at the Forum for all Political Parties, I argued that in the eyes of many the EPRDF would no longer be the EPRDF if it reversed its support for some of the founding principles of the federation, such as Article 9, the sovereignty of ethnocultural communities; Article 39, the right to self-determination up to secession; and Article 40, the collective ownership of land. Deviation from these constitutional principles would mean that Ethiopia had moved into a post-EPRDF era.
Now the key questions are: Are these constitutional provisions still the core principles EPRDF and are they fully supported by powerful members? Is EPRDF now a federalist or a majoritarian force? Procedurally, is EPRDF still guided by the principle of Democratic Centralism?
My answers to all are in the negative. The powerful ideological and organizational adhesive of EPRDF is no longer shared, even superficially. Like galaxies in the cosmos, the EPRDF’s four building blocks are drifting apart.
EPRDF’s Emergence
EPRDF was an offshoot of the Student Movement of the 1970s that played a key role in the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution that toppled Emperor Haile Selassie. Though highly contested by its peers in the opposition, the EPRDF founders considered itself a continuity of the 1970s Ethiopian Student Movement. Five vital characteristics of the Student Movement were
The ‘question of nationalities’ (a popular term for the 1960s struggle against ethno-linguistic domination, famously referred to as ‘Ye BiherBiheresebTiyaque’ in Amharic),
The ‘land question’ (‘Ye MeriyetTiyaque’ or ‘Land to the Tiller’, ‘Meret La Rashu’),
Unquestioning support for Marxist-Leninist ideology,
Extreme intolerance of any form of dissent and 5) high commitment to public service.
After EPRDF seized power in Ethiopia in 1991, the federal constitution stipulated state ownership of the land. Federalism became an institutional form for the protection, expression, and promotion of nationalities. The drafters of the constitution favored a model of consociational democracy, where ethno-linguistic communities would be meaningfully represented in all government institutions and hold sovereign constitutional power over federal and regional states. Such communities are entitled by the constitution to establish regional states or even claim full independence.
The Ethiopian federal system was intended to contain disintegrative forces and to create a balance between centripetal and centrifugal drifts. Critics of this system claim that it may encourage disintegration, whilst others portray it as detrimental to the self-determination of ethno-linguistic communities, with the intention of continuing the domination from the center that prevailed for a long time in Ethiopia.
EPRDF in Paralysis
Since taking state power in 1991, EPRDF has faced several crises including the major split in 2001, and mass protests in 2005 and 2015. The crisis that began in the protests of 2015 in Oromia regional state has inflicted grave blows and left EPRDF paralyzed. Internal divisions have been so great within EPRDF’s leadership that it denied former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, also Chairperson of the front, the command and control the position once enjoyed.
The paralysis was attributable to the internal weakness of the EPRDF, namely corruption, power struggles, and a lack of shared vision for the future. The external forces with strategic interests hostile to Ethiopia, competition among great powers due to a shift of focus from a war on terror to strategic competition between USA, on one hand, and China and Russia on the other, accelerated this change. Foreign-based Ethiopian activists also played a critical role. The rise of populism from corrupt elements within EPRDF accelerated these changes.
Eventually, Hailemariam resigned and Abiy Ahmed was elected chairperson. Since then, significant changes have come to Ethiopia. But new and outstanding questions remain unanswered. Key among them is whether the front transforms into one party and the fate of affiliated parties ruling Somali, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Harar. The issues of equity in voting within EPRDF, and the fate of the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement, along with other thorny questions.
But meanwhile, the EPRDF’s internal power struggles persist. Failure of the EPRDF leadership to mend its division at this Congress may lead to imminent fragmentation. The coalition is still there for the sole reason that the party is in power. It lacks a shared ideological doctrine worth standing and fighting for. Once its power base is eroded, the remaining institutional unity of EPRDF will wither away. But what may bring about such self-destruction?
Reconstituted Front
Consensus democracy is the core of the federal constitution. Lijphart Arend, a leading scholar on democracies, asserts that the two primary characteristics of consociational democracy are: sharing of executive power under grand coalition and two, group autonomy with mutual veto power and proportionality in power sharing.
The Ethiopian constitution confers veto powers to the regional states. It also grants fundamental rights to each cultural community including the freedom to enjoy autonomy, establish own regional state and even seek an independent sovereign state if they so wish and fulfil the preconditions. This is reflective of the consensus principle that promotes the idea that democracy should be designed to represent all interests and provide numerous checks and balance on the majority. Thus, the federal constitution redefined Ethiopianism and reconceptualized it as egalitarian, inclusive and multicultural identity drawn from a federation of diverse cultures.
This redefinition is now under severe attack from both old absolutist Ethiopianism, and extreme ethno-nationalism. A groundswell of populism has caused a drift to majoritarianism even within the EPRDF. The surge of populism of absolutist Ethiopianist, extreme ethnonationalist, and hyper Pan-Ethiopianists is in total control of some regional states, particularly Amhara and Oromia, and to a limited extent in other regions, such as parts of Southern Nations (Wolayta, Sidama), Tigray, Somali and Afar.
Political forces in these regions supported by Diaspora-based activists are pushing the politics of hate, fear, and resentment. This has led to clashes between regional states on the pretext of internal boundary disputes (Oromia and Somali), or between a regional state (Somali) and the federal government.
In addition to the mob attacks and vigilante incidents, this could lead to intensifying conflict between states or between a state and the central government. These confrontational trends, if left unabated, may set Amhara in a collision course with Tigray over the Wolkait area boundary dispute, and, even worse, between the federal government and Tigray, as it exercises its constitutional rights.
Majoritarian Drift
The father of the consensus-based federal system, EPRDF, is increasingly finding it difficult to be the champion of inclusive Ethiopian identity. Though it is the author of the anti-majoritarian federal constitution, ERPDF has found itself in a majoritarian drift that is antagonistic to consensus constitutional democracy envisaged by the constitution.
Academics such as Lahra Smith found the current constitution does not enjoy equal degree of support in all regional states by all communities. For instance, in Amhara, most of the political parties reject the constitution, while others including in Oromia may demand critical amendments to introduce a new form of majoritarian rule including presidential system. But, in the rest of the states, particularly in Afar, Tigray, Somali, Gambella, support for the constitution seems strong.
In contrast to consensus democracy, the majoritarian principle emphasizes the concentration of power in the hands of the majority. Peter Emerson, in his book From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics, stresses “unfortunately, one of the worst democratic structures is the most ubiquitous: majority rule based on majority voting. It must be emphasized, furthermore, that these two practices are often the catalysts of division and bitterness, if not indeed violence and war.”
Majoritarianism contradicts consensus constitutional democracy. Such majoritarianism will destroy not only EPRDF but also the equilibrium on which progressive and inclusive Pan-Ethiopianism was built. To make radical change to the current constitutional order, the majoritarian drift may introduce a presidential system (replacing parliamentary system), and even employ public referendum (in place of amendments). This drift to majoritarianism may end up in a constitutional crisis and protracted instability.
Developmental Dead End
Convinced that the constitution had helped to address long-standing political questions of the 1970s Student Movement, the EPRDF chose to focus on poverty eradication as a priority. For the EPRDF, state ownership of land and an emphasis on group rights were the logical culmination of the ‘national questions’ of the Student Movement and the armed struggle that followed.
As I discussed in a co-authored 2015 research paper, through enabling state ownership of the land and adopting a federal system, the EPRDF believes that it has fulfilled the core demands of the Movement. It believes that peace and economic development in Ethiopia can only be achieved through federal arrangements and protection of the overwhelmingly agrarian population from displacement due to dispossession of its land. For the opposition parties, the EPRDF’s land and federal policies are a means to maintain power by controlling land—the vital means of economic activity for the great majority of Ethiopians.
Rejecting the neoliberal economic path, EPRDF also looked to the east for inspiration on developmental state. China, Singapore, and South Korea provided good examples on which the EPRDF decided to base its economic model, albeit with some adjustments to reflect Ethiopia’s historical, cultural and other national peculiarities. With authoritarian or Marxist-dominant parties at some time in their history, these countries have a highly dominant ethnic community and are less heterogeneous than Ethiopia.
In general, Developmental States emphasize the delivery of public services over democratic governance. At the center of the Developmental State (DS) is a monopoly of power. The DS not only provides the legislative, regulatory and enforcement mechanisms within which the market operates but also defines the direction of the political economy, providing a lead for all public and private actors engaged in economic activities. Accordingly, the state monopolizes not only the means and use of violence, norm-setting mandates, and regulatory and enforcement powers but also the economic space of the country.
Thus, the EPRDF’s idea of the DS reverses the traditional capitalist conception of the respective roles of the public and private sector in the economy. In a market economy, the state intervenes to correct market failure. In the Ethiopian DS, while the state invests, the private sector intervenes to complement the public investment and economic actions of the state. In a nutshell, the private sector fills the ‘state gaps’ in the economy. The state dominates, whereas the private sector plays a supportive role.
Once termed by the World Bank as “The Ethiopian Way”, the DS brought transformations that the free market would not have been able to bring by its own.
As a coalition, EPRDF looks now set to abandon its economic focus on the DS. Three factors may play essential roles: ideological differences; continued instability’ and geopolitical competition between great powers for economic domination. It is unlikely to continue to implement its pro-poor developmental policies with the same dedication due to divisions within itself, and the advent of coalition politics. Monopoly of power uninterrupted by election cycles is a vital element for a DS. Without such stability, economic delivery will be slow-paced at best, or cause an economic crisis at worst.
The recent instability in Ethiopia may overshadow the economic progress Ethiopia has already made under EPRDF in recent decades. In the past three decades or so, Ethiopia’s stability had three pillars: the ruling party EPRDF, the security sector including the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, Federal and Regional Police, and the intelligence services; and the collective social psychology of Ethiopians emanating from the history of uninterrupted statehood.
Ethiopia seems now to be in a post-EPRDF-dominated era, but without strong institutions. The security sector, including the military, is timorous, more reticent to act than ever. They remain apprehensive and prone to fragmentation if not insulated from the political schisms of the ruling party and ethnicity-based political mobilizations. Coalition politics is in sight, but without the requisite institutions, and without the necessary mentality required in the population at large. The likely ensuing protracted instability may curtail the chances for continued rapid development.
EPRDF Abroad: Neutrality Neutered?
In a detailed study on Ethiopia’s foreign relations published in 2017, I argued that the “emerging geopolitical and geo-economic issues that may impair the diplomatic achievements of Ethiopia if the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) is not urgently reappraised…Otherwise, internal political crises, the conflicts in Yemen and the Middle East, migration into the EU, rivalry around Nile River hydro-politics and transnational threats such as terrorism and violent extremism may well serve to impair the impressive economic and diplomatic progress Ethiopia has made thus far.”
I also argued that Ethiopia’s successful policy of military containment and diplomatic isolation of Eritrea since the border war 1998 cannot be maintained without the full support of regional and global allies. “In the ‘no-war, no-peace’ stalemate that followed the end of the border war with Eritrea in 2000, and against the background of Ethiopia’s successful policy of military containment and diplomatic isolation, the Eritrean army had been weakened to the point where it was barely able to defend the country [LOL].
EPRDF Congress
The congruence of recent developments in the Middle East, EU and Horn of Africa has, however, substantially eroded the effectiveness of Ethiopia’s policy, requiring significant revision of [FANSPS].”
Thus, it was only natural for Ethiopia to revise its policy on Eritrea, and try to mend relations, as diplomatic isolation does not work without allies. Within Ethiopia too, this has led to the euphoria of peace, love, reconciliation, and democracy. This has provided strong positive optics that should be built on.
For a long time, EPRDF has been able to maintain some degree of policy sovereignty. For this reason, EPRDF battled against IMF, World Bank, and other influences, and successfully managed to curve out economic policy sovereignty. As increasingly upsetting to the Western countries, Ethiopia’s voting behavior in the United National Security Council (UNSC) especially related to Crimea/Ukraine and Syria were indicative of the sovereign strength of the Ethiopian government.
At the same time, EPRDF was able to enjoy a significant level of cooperation with the USA and Europe on peace and security and other issues such as climate change. Maintaining the success of the new regional diplomacy in relation to the peaceful resolution of disputes also requires care to ensure that Ethiopia maintains its policy sovereignty.
The EPRDF leadership under former Prime Minister Hailemariam failed to read the signals of the imminent US policy shifts. As early as 2010, the ‘Asia pivot’ signaled the shift in US policy towards China with indirect consequences to those considered allies. Embroiled in its internal small squabbles, EPRDF, and particularly TPLF, failed to pick up these signals and accordingly deliberate and prepare itself for the implications of the shift in US policy.
EPRDF has become the unintended target of US policy shift from the war on terror to an economic confrontation with China. Within EPRDF, the hardcore ideology of the Developmental State and sovereignty comes from TPLF and hence, TPLF became the target of this unforgiving pivot from the USA.
EPRDF’s current approach stands against the longstanding Ethiopian stance of neutrality in its diplomatic relations with Middle Eastern crises and competition between great powers. Now, Ethiopia is increasingly getting closer to the Saudi-led bloc. Eritrea is out of the diplomatic isolation, Egypt and Gulf countries have overrun, if not conclusively, the last obstacles in their effort to put the Horn of Africa under their sphere of influence. On the Nile River and GERD, the high moral and legal ground has been lost both internationally and regionally. Uganda, South Sudan, DRC, Burundi may backpedal on their pledge to sign the Comprehensive Framework Agreement for managing the Nile basin.
A Looming Crisis
Highly pragmatic in retaining and maintaining political power, EPRDF may survive the current internal ideological and organizational tremors. It may go through a metamorphosis of survival like before. Discovering a united vision among its coalition members will be critical in finding a new equilibrium. In the short-term, and as a tactical measure, coalition members of EPRDF may prefer to stick together.
This way, EPRDF would probably fail to reinvent itself and remain as a nominal coalition, therefore unlikely to stand together at the next election. In the final analysis, lacking ideological dynamism and support from key Western allies, EPRDF will fail to revitalize to regain the dominance of the political and economic space it once enjoyed at national and regional level.
However, there are more compelling reasons to believe that lacking adequate dynamism and ideological cohesion to resuscitate it, EPRDF may fragment, with each coalition member seeking new coalitions on an ideological basis.
The EPRDF parties are in a race to populism within their regional states. The centripetal equilibrium of EPRDF is no more, as the principle of democratic centralism is debilitated. For instance, with strong democratic centralism, there was no open campaigning for positions. Aspirants always said they are soldiers that are ready to work wherever the party deploys them. This was part reality, part fiction, and now it has turned to a total fiction. To be sure there was always a whispering campaign for candidates, but EPRDF has now moved from whispering campaign to open social media campaign in its elections since the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam. This decline of EPRDF’s command and control helps in exercising genuine federalism, and actually, the functioning of some regional states look more like a confederal system.
For now, the only element holding EPRDF together is power and the responsibility associated with ruling a country. Further attempts to renew EPRDF may lead to referendums to change the constitution. Such popular votes may focus on the key constitutional provisions like Article 9, Article 39, and Article 40 with implications for the federal state structure, regional state boundaries, the parliamentary system, and procedures for constitutional amendments. However, a change of position on these provisions will mean entering a substantively post-EPRDF era.
The only element holding EPRDF together is power and the responsibility associated with ruling a country
More importantly, the introduction of the referendum to amend the constitution will be unconstitutional, unless the constitution is first amended as per Article 104. Amendment of such kind at this time may also face significant resistances from regional states and political actors.
This Congress is also held at a time where competitive politics of coalition is setting in without the necessary democratic institutional framework and public mindset. The ruling parties in these regional states, particularly ANDM (now ADP), OPDO (now ODP) and Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement will face stiff competition from contending with perhaps more popular parties.
Tigray strongly supports the current constitution. In relative terms, the ruling party, TPLF, also enjoys popular legitimacy. Nonetheless, the region faces a serious democratic deficit, and its development is not on a par with other regional states. Politics in Ethiopia will soon become a dogfight between federalist and assimilationist, and between the Pan-Ethiopianist and absolutists. But in Tigray, the opposition parties are yet to garner sufficient popular support to challenge TPLF.
The change will occur without the necessary preparations for transforming the existing institutions to neutral and independent democratic ones capable of entertaining coalition politics. This risks the state’s stability.
EPRDF leaders are trying to ride three waves of populism: absolutist Ethiopianist, extreme ethnonationalist, and hyper Pan-Ethiopianists that have clashing end-states. Populism has now spread beyond the control of its creators. Rather, the waves are in control of the riders. EPRDF will fail to satisfy either of them, and in the process undermine the progress made so far, making the transition even more precarious.
With regional states driven by populism, the implications of such forces on security sector actors will be far reaching. Uncertainty and volatility may bring more instability and violence that might increase the current atrocities and frighten the private sector and foreign investment.
A long drawn-out internal struggle within EPRDF and with other political parties may undermine the single-minded focus that governments require in order to achieve the fast-paced delivery that is necessary to escape permanent poverty. With higher instability, delivery of public goods, EPRDF’s longstanding source of legitimacy, will deteriorate. Unless EPRDF is able to substitute performance legitimacy through popular legitimacy soon, then EPRDF faces defeat in electoral politics. EPRDF, as a coalition of forces of equality, will have a hard time adjusting to popular politics.
U.S. economist Paul Romer once said, “a crisis is a terrible thing to waste.” Depending on the collective wisdom of the EPRDF leadership, this crisis, like before, could offer EPRDF another chance for revitalization. No one will benefit from defending the old EPRDF. In addition to external forces with hostile interest with Ethiopia, the old EPRDF was the source of much of the trouble the country faced and faces.
The status quo is not the nirvana some EPRDF leaders try to portray it as, and it will not last long. No useful purpose will be served by dwelling the mistakes of the past. Defending the historical and the status quo are not only losing fights, but also deflect the energy we need to search for new common ground for a consensus-based federal system.
Closure for many hurt by past violations is paramount so that they can play an active role in the future of Ethiopia. EPRDF leaders and supporters need to reject both defeatist siege mentality, prevent any isolationist tendencies, and above all avoid infantile Panglossian ideas. Sober analysis, strategic foresight, and a forward-looking stance could at least save the country, if not also EPRDF.
Five Steps to Save the Federation
EPRDF has to communicate a clear blueprint for the changes it is introducing, and on how to handle the new political dispensation. To avert the negative implications of the new politics, the federal government and all regional states, and particularly the Houses of Peoples’ Representatives and Federation should urgently consider the following.
1) Consensus-based constitutional federal system
The current constitution confers veto power to all regional state when it comes to substantive amendments of the constitution. Any amendment to the constitution should be initiated and ratified as prescribed under Article 104 and 105. Only the House of Peoples’ Representatives, the House of Federation or the Councils of Regional States could trigger constitutional amendments.
The constitution was not ratified by popular referendum, neither does it stipulate amendment through popular referendum. While a popular referendum may look democratic, in a constitutive process of diverse countries, referenda could degenerate to majoritarian rule, the very reason why Ethiopia and many other countries failed to effectively govern diversity, and opted for consensus democracy over majoritarian democracy. While amendments to the constitution are constitutionally permitted, amendment during such transitional period only festers political differences and could lead to constitutional crisis and even worse violent conflict.
2. Establish, by an act of parliament, an inclusive National Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission
This must be created as a transitional pathway towards peaceful, democratic and prosperous Ethiopia. The first act of all participants in this process will be to officially declare cessation of all physical and verbal hostilities and to pledge to the peoples of Ethiopia to remain peaceful.
The success of the dialogue will be determined by the institutionalization of such a process, its impact on bringing necessary reforms in our political culture and all public institutions; the inclusiveness and political will of all actors, design and structure of process, and mechanisms for the implementation of the outcomes of the dialogue. Such institutionalized National Dialogue could serve as a big tent where all strands of opinion are represented under one roof to deliberate on major challenges of the country, forge a national consensus, and advance concrete actionable recommendation for institutional transformation in the country.
3. Develop a nationwide pact on common interests
The National Dialogue needs to enhance tolerance, and respect for each other, and foster shared vision and unity of purpose around a constitutional democratic Ethiopia. In order to have an agreement on minimum common ground focusing on national agenda, the National Dialogue should come up with a pact on the vital interests of Ethiopia that foster the equality of cultures and territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. This requires enlightened elite that thinks beyond ‘vanity of petty differences’ and political forces that are ready to compromise.
4. Overhaul all democratic institutions to make them fit for transformation and coalition-based political process
The urgent priority, for now, is a meritocracy-based vetting process for the officials leading and running the democratic institutions.
5. Promote democratic citizenship and forge a unity of purpose
An empowered democratic citizenry is a key to increasing the accountability of officials through constitutional democratic institutions. Ultimately building human rights-protective federalism would depend on empowered citizenship rather than sectarianism. Striking the balance between the forces of unity and diversity, Ethiopia should spend its resources on building progressive federalism with an integrative and human-rights-protective agenda. In this regard the federal government has to make sure that Chapter Three of the constitution on human and democratic rights, both individual and group rights, is observed by all state and non-state actors.
UN-OCHA: 700,000 people (Kenya), 1.6 million people (Somalia), 6.1 million people (South Sudan), 7.9 million people (Ethiopia) and 6.2 million people (Sudan) are food insecure.
Horn of Africa Food Insecurity Outlook. According to UN OCHA, 22.4 million people in the Horn of Africa region are food insecure and need food aid.
The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) revealed on Wednesday that 22.4 million people in the Horn of Africa region need food aid.
In a press statement, UN-OCHA, said 700,000 people in Kenya, 1.6 million people in Somalia, 6.1 million people in South Sudan, 7.9 million people in Ethiopia and 6.2 million people in Sudan are food insecure.
UN-OCHA said conflict and internal violence has contributed to a spike in the number of food insecure people in Sudan and South Sudan, although sustained humanitarian response and good rainfall in Somalia has helped to slightly decrease the number of food insecure people in Somalia.
UN-OCHA further said the Horn of Africa region is also suffering from displacement crisis mainly because of armed conflict and internal violence, mainly in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan.
Ethnic violence along the common border of Ethiopia’s Gedeo zone in Southern regional and West Guji zone in Oromia regional state since April has led to the displacement of around 960,000 Ethiopians, contributing to a dramatic spike in the number of internally displaced people in Ethiopia in recent months.
The UN-OCHA report also revealed conflicts have led to the creation of around 3.82 million refugees in and from the Horn of Africa region.
Rendered obsolete? Growing Chinese debt, construction delays, a looming land saga, Ethiopia and Uganda’s decision to diversify their port options through Eritrea and Tanzania respectively, etc… put the US$29 billion Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport corridor project (LAPSSET) into a greater uncertainty.
The Eritrea and Ethiopia peace agreement signed in July will not have any negative impact on the implementation and operationalization of the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (Lapsset) corridor project.
This is according to Lapsset Corridor Development Authority (LCDA) Chief Executive Officer Silvester Kasuku who downplayed emerging fears that the peace deal which has now created a close working relationship between the two former rival countries will enable Ethiopia, a landlocked country, to have access to the port in Eritrea [Assab and Massawa], which is in addition to Djibouti.
Decades of Conflict
Critics have also argued that Ethiopia’s plans to work closely with Somalia in a move to establish a similar corridor shall put in doubt the Lapsset components that originally hoped to service the landlocked country.
In an exclusive interview with Nation yesterday, Mr. Kasuku insisted that the peace deal between the two countries will have no impact on the Sh 2.5trillion project since it will handle the entire southern Ethiopia which has about 50 million people.
Mr. Kasuku also reiterated that other ports like Djibouti and Eritrea handle North of Addis Ababa and therefore the relevancy of the Lapsset components even after the peace agreement is still intact.
Following decades of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the latter was forced to heavily rely on Djibouti and before the peace deal was signed, it hoped that Lamu would give it access to another port, especially to serve its southern regions.
The agreement now lays out a new era of cooperation between the former enemies, including re-establishing telecommunication and transport links, reopening embassies and resolving a border dispute that has locked them in conflict since the late 1990s.
Bilateral Talks
But the Lapsset CEO said all these will have no negative implications on the project. “We have already discussed that in length including meeting Ethiopian Marine Authority officials in a bid to secure continued support for Lapsset. People should beware that Lamu Port will strategically be located to service southern Ethiopia even when the country has access to Eritrean and Djiboutian ports. The two ports will actively handle North of Addis Ababa,” said Mr. Kasuku.
In an earlier statement, LCDA announced that Ethiopia and Kenya had already signed bilateral arrangements regarding Lapsset’s oil pipeline, road connections, railways, and port.
“Southern Ethiopia and the Hawassa Industrial Park will be served by these infrastructure projects. Our project will be in overdrive,” said the authority.
The project’s plan includes a 32-berth port, transportation hubs for rail, highway and international airports in Lamu, Isiolo and Lodwar, an oil pipeline from South Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia to Lamu port, an oil refinery and three resort cities in Isiolo, Lamu and Turkana.
Deepen Trade Ties
The integrated transport corridor is expected to open up the northern parts of Kenya where the government has until now invested little in infrastructure.
It is also expected to link Kenya with Ethiopia and South Sudan, with hopes of deepening trade among the three countries.
So far, the construction of the first three deep-sea berths in Kililana, Lamu West, is on the course and 55 percent complete.
The three berths cost the government Sh48 billion which includes their construction plus other activities such as preparation of the turning bay, dredging, and reclamation work as well as navigation of sea waves. “The first berth out of the three is 72 percent complete and we expect it to be ready by June 2019. The other two are set to be complete by 2020,” said Mr. Kasuku.
A wake up call? Ethiopian State Television ETV reported that the hundreds of soldiers that marched to the State Palace to demand a pay rise and reform within the military have reached a tentative agreement with the Prime Minister.
BY TESFANEWS
Ethiopian State Television ETV reported that the hundreds of soldiers that marched to the State Palace in Addis Ababa today to demand a pay rise and reform within the military, have reached a tentative agreement with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
In addition to asking for pay rises, the soldiers asked PM Abiy to “review the structure and operations of the military”, ETV said [see the video below].
The unexpected and unannounced show by these soldiers at the office of the Prime Minister led to a momentary panic in Addis Ababa that led to the shutting down of the Internet for nearly three hours.
ETV said it had been shut off to prevent fake news circulating on social media.
Fitsum Arega, Chief of staff at the PM office said, the prime minister “listened to their grievances carefully, reprimanded them for the wrong procedure they followed to express those grievances, but concluded the meeting with a promise to meet in the near future to positively consider their demands.”
According to the Federal Police Commissioner, Zeinu Jamal, the soldiers first demanded that they enter the premises of the Palace armed with their weapons. There was boost up of security at and near the Palace out of an abundance of caution.
However, they were let in and meet Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen after they had been disarmed.
A Facebook post made by the Deputy Prime Minister states that, the soldiers have discussed on wide range of issues with him, and promised that a nationwide reform would be implemented within the national defense force.
Later, the soldiers also met and discussed with the Prime Minister. But PM Abiy has jokingly ordered them to do some push-ups as a form of punishment for showing up at his office without prior appointment.
But he also got down to the ground and did the push-ups with the soldiers.
On the invitation of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki arrived in Addis Ababa this morning to conduct a two-day working visit in Ethiopia.
Upon arrival at Bole International Airport, Prime Minster Abiy Ahmed and higher government officials accorded him a warm welcome.
This is his second visit to Ethiopia following the signing of the Joint Declaration on Peace and Friendship that ended the two-decade war between the two countries.
President Isaias and Premier Abiy are expected to discuss the progress of the peace accord signed between the two countries last July as well as on other topics of mutual interest.
President Isaias is also expected to visit some development projects in Ethiopia.
Today, he began his Ethiopia tour by attending the official inaugural ceremony of the Omo Kuraz III sugar factory located in Southern Omo city of Jinka, as the guest of honor.
Omo kuraz, which is one of the four sugar projects being built at a cost of $290 million loans obtained from Chinese Development Bank, is expected to produce 8,000 to 10,000 quintal of sugar a day.
The inauguration of Omo Kuraz III Sugar Factory raises the number of sugar producing factories in Ethiopia to eight, according to the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation.
PM Abiy Ahmed formed a new cabinet with a record number of women – 50 percent. (Stringer/AFP/Getty Images)
BY TESFANEWS *
Ethiopia’s prime minister has announced a new cabinet that is half female, including the job of defense minister.
Explaining his decision in a speech to Parliament, PM Abiy said women had made a great contribution to restoring peace and stability, “were less corrupt than men”, respected their work and could restore peace and stability.
The new cabinet, which reduces ministerial positions from 28 to 20, has women in the top security posts for the first time in Ethiopia’s history.
Aisha Mohammed will be in charge of defense, and Muferiat Kamil, a former parliamentary speaker, will head the newly formed Ministry of Peace.
Since becoming prime minister in April, Mr. Abiy has carried numerous massive reforms for this once-authoritarian country.
He has ended two decades of conflict with neighbouring Eritrea, released thousands of political prisoners and promising to open up the economy.
Muferiat Kamil, as the new Minister of Peace, shall be overseeing the country’s intelligence and security apparatus, including the federal police.
Also represented in the new cabinet are often marginalized ethnic groups.
Aisha Mohammed, the new first female defense minister, is from the country’s Afar region in the north-east, and had previously served as construction minister, while Finance Minister Ahmed Shide is from the Somali region.
Abiy was elected by the ruling party after years of anti-government protests shook the country. He immediately embarked on reforms and has promised free and competitive elections in 2020. The ruling party currently holds all the seats in Parliament.
“Democracy is an existential issue for Ethiopia. There is no option but multi-partyism,” said PM Abiy in an interview with Dr. Greg Mills.
The new cabinet has been downsized from 28 to 20, women win half of the cabinet post in a reshuffle.
Foreign Ministers of Eritrea and Ethiopia have arrived in the Somali capital Mogadishu for a one-day high-level talk and to reaffirm their solidarity with the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Somali people.
Somalia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmed Isse Awad received his counterparts, Osman Saleh of Eritrea and Dr. Workneh Gebeyehu of Ethiopia, on their arrival at Mogadishu airport.
The visit was part of the heightened diplomatic cooperation between the three nations and the continuing dialogue process following the Trilateral Agreement signed by the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia in Asmara on September 2018.
FM Osman and Workneh also met and deliver messages from their respective leaders to President Mohammed Abdulahi Mohammed Farmajo at Villa Somalia.
The Ministers also held talks with Somali Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre.
The leaders discussed progress on the trilateral agreement of joint cooperation in the economic, political and security fields and reaffirmed their continued commitment to contributing jointly to peace, stability, and progress in the Horn of Africa.
They also considered the positive developments in the region since the signing of the trilateral agreement, such as the reopening of borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the resumption of direct commercial flights to the capitals of the three countries.
In a joint press statement issued after the discussion [see below], the foreign ministers of Ethiopia and Eritrea reaffirmed their firm support for the government and people of Somalia.
They also called upon the international community to stand united in support of the government of Somalia’s efforts in pursuing much-needed reforms to foster Somali’s long-term recovery.
The foreign ministers further appealed to all stakeholders to work towards the peace and stability of Somalia.
Joint Press Statement Following the Visit by the Foreign Ministers of Eritrea and Ethiopia to Mogadishu, October 2018
The Foreign Ministers of the State of Eritrea H.E Osman Saleh Mohammed and the Foreign Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia H.E Workneh Gebeyehu paid an official visit to Mogadishu, Somalia on 17 October 2018.
The visit was part of the heightened diplomatic cooperation between the three nations and the continuing dialogue process following the Trilateral Agreement signed by the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia in Asmara, in September 2018.
During the visit, the Foreign Ministers were received by the Somali Foreign Minister and paid a courtesy call on H.E Mohamed Abdulahi Mohamed Farmaajo, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia.
The Ministers also held talks with Prime Minister H.E. Hassan Ali Khaire.
In the course of the engagement, the leaders discussed progress on the trilateral agreement of joint cooperation in the economic, political and security fields and reaffirmed their continued commitment to contributing jointly to peace, stability, and progress in the Horn of Africa.
The leaders also consider the positive developments in the region since the signing of the Trilateral Agreement, such as the reopening of borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the resumption f direct commercial flights to the capitals of all three nations.
While conveying messages on behalf of their Heads of State and Government, the Foreign Ministers of Eritrea and Ethiopia reaffirmed their support for the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Somali people.
The Ministers commended the recent progress made by the Foreign Government of Somalia in their reforms of the economic and security sectors as well as the progress on the various political processes.
The Foreign Ministers appreciate the Somalia people and Federal Government’s reform efforts expressing the growing trust in Somalia’s institutions by the international community.
The ministers reiterated that Eritrea and Ethiopia will continue to stand firmly by the people of Somalia and its leadership as they present the best hope for the nation’s recovery. They called upon the entire international community to stand united in support of the Federal Government’s efforts in pursuing much-needed reforms to foster Somalia’s long-term recovery.
Ministers of Eritrea and Ethiopia appeal to all stakeholder, internal or external, to work towards the peace and stability of Somalia.
While reaffirming their mutual respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence of all three nations, the leaders restated their commitment to the security, prosperity, and stability of the region.
At the end of the visit, the Foreign Ministers expressed their sincere gratitude for the cordial hospitality accorded to them and their delegation.
Eritrea’s commitment toward a lasting peace with Ethiopia and its pragmatic effort towards increased security, stability, and prosperity in the Horn of Africa and the wider Red Sea region, is not a recent or new development.
BY FIKREJESUS AMAHAZION (Ph.D.)
Over the past several months, the powerful winds of change have swept across the Horn of Africa, ushering in the possibility of lasting peace, stability, and security. The rapidly unfolding, momentous events are both highly encouraging and a greatly welcome development in a long-troubled region. While the spate of peace declarations and cooperation agreements has elicited considerable comment and discussion, especially in regard to Eritrea, it is important to re-examine and clarify a number of points.
First, in stark contrast to the general portrayal, Eritrea’s commitment toward peace with Ethiopia is not a recent or new development, a point clearly illustrated and substantiated by the historical record.
For example, after the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) rendered its ruling on 13 April 2002, Eritrea accepted the EEBC’s decisions in their entirety and without equivocation or ambiguity, hoping that the final determination of the border would open the doors to lasting peace and development between the two countries and the region as a whole.
Unfortunately, however, Ethiopia’s response was different. Although Article 4.15 of the Algiers Peace Agreement (voluntarily signed by Eritrea and Ethiopia on 12 December 2000) clearly stipulates that both Eritrea and Ethiopia “agree that the delimitation and demarcation determinations of the Commission shall be final and binding,” Ethiopia completely failed to abide by its legal obligations and responsibilities, and persistently sought to obstruct, subvert, or reverse the EEBC’s rulings.
Shortly after the verdict, Ethiopia actually appeared to accept the EEBC ruling. Both the Ethiopian Foreign Minister and the country’s parliament made statements proclaiming Ethiopia’s “satisfaction” with and wholehearted “acceptance” of the decision, and the Ethiopian government also expressed gratitude to the Commission for delivering a “just” verdict, even calling on the international community to “compel Eritrea to agree to a speedy demarcation.”
However, this initial line of approach was quickly and dramatically reversed. In 2003, Ethiopia denounced the ruling as “illegal, unjust and irresponsible,” while castigating the Boundary Commission and seeking to reopen the EEBC’s decisions through an “alternative mechanism.”
Subsequently, in 2004, Ethiopia vacillated again, this time shifting its position to claim that it accepted the ruling “in principle,” but within the context of various and numerous reservations, qualifications, and preconditions prior to implementation.
Ethiopia also began to establish illegal settlements within sovereign Eritrean territories, and in 2006 the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Seyoum Mesfin, sent a highly publicized letterto the President of the EEBC, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, again criticizing the EEBC.
Despite Ethiopia’s patent failure to abide by its legal obligations and responsibilities, manifest in its military occupation of large swathes of Eritrean territory (including Badme, the flashpoint for the war) and policy of unremitting aggression and hostility against its northern neighbor, Eritrea, to its credit, remained committed to peace and the rule of law, and generally sought to uphold the integrity of the Algiers Peace Agreement. It vehemently rejected the UN/US supported “appointments of special envoys” – Lloyd Axworthy and Dan Forth respectively – as it knew full well that these “alternative mechanisms” were primarily conceived and designed to circumvent and alter the “final and binding” legal ruling of the EEBC.
Eritrea also refused to engage in “dialogue” with the Ethiopian regime, in spite of intense pressure to do so from vast segments of the international community, as this was, again, rightly interpreted as another tool for confounding the problem and in effect, a thinly-veiled euphemism for discarding the EEBC ruling.
This is the historical and diplomatic backdrop to the momentous event of the Comprehensive Peace and Friendship Agreement signed between Eritrea and Ethiopia on 9 July this year. This agreement is squarely anchored on the unequivocal implementation of the EEBC ruling and respect of each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Credit is, of course, due to the resilience of the Eritrean people and the statesmanship, vision, and boldness of President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, who took office in April on the back of years of massive anti-government protests across Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Prime Minister has indeed played a pivotal role in making the recent rapprochement possible. That said, it is also indisputable that Eritrea has long been committed to genuine peace with Ethiopia, based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Second, there are lingering misconceptions surrounding the EEBC. As the recent peace initiatives have given rise to great optimism and a sense of hope across the region, many commentators have also looked back upon the long period of “no war, no peace” between Eritrea and Ethiopia and attributed it to alleged flaws and shortcomings of the EEBC process and ruling. Once again, however, this is far from accurate.
Formally established in 2001 in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Algiers Peace Agreement, which was guaranteed by the UN and the OAU/AU and witnessed by the US, the European Union (EU), and Algeria, the EEBC consisted of five distinguished and highly respected international jurists. Ethiopia and Eritrea appointed two commissioners each, while the fifth commissioner, serving as the president of the Commission, was selected by the party-appointed commissioners. After a lengthy investigation and litigation process, the Commission presented a report described by many as being based on sound legal principles and a rigorous examination of detailed historical and other evidence. Furthermore, the Commission’s ruling was authoritative, objective, and impartial, notably being immediately and strongly endorsed by numerous countries and international organizations.
Beyond being inaccurate, solely or overwhelmingly focusing on supposed flaws with the EEBC ruling or process overlooks how the international community egregiously shirked its fundamental moral and legal duties and simply turned a blind eye to Ethiopia’s flagrant violation of international law.
Despite the Algiers Peace Agreement containing explicit provisions stipulating the invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to impose punitive measures on the recalcitrant party, both the UN and AU, as guarantors, failed to fulfill their mandate and carry out their responsibility to guarantee the EEBC ruling without preconditions and enforce both parties to implement it.
Remarkably, little was done or even said in response to Ethiopia’s violation. In fact, the international community, led by the US, actually supported – actively or implicitly – Ethiopia’s refusal to implement the EEBC ruling (for example, through raising unrelated issues and exploring options for “an alternative mechanism” to the EEBC, as per Ethiopia’s requests).
The simple fact of the matter is that Ethiopia could not have managed to violate fundamental pillars of international law to occupy sovereign Eritrean territories with impunity, without overarching international political and diplomatic support and protection.
Finally, many recent headlines and articles have crudely equated Eritrea and Ethiopia to small, weak pawns being maneuvered by larger, more powerful players from the neighboring region. Although it is certainly true that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have become increasingly active within the Horn of Africa in recent times, as well as playing a significant role in paving the path toward normalization, this characterization crudely diminishes and denies the courageous, forward-looking role and initiative undertaken by Eritreans and Ethiopians themselves.
In terms of Eritrea, such simplistic portrayals are also belied by the fact that it has historically been, and continues to be, firmly guided by a clear policy of nonalignment, independence, and self-reliance. The country remains singularly and unfailingly averse to dependency and fiercely protective of its sovereignty. As well, despite being a small country with relatively limited capabilities, Eritrea’s pragmatic efforts toward increased engagement, strengthened ties, and closer cooperation in all areas with the governments of the region allow it to contribute actively to the potential for lasting peace, security, stability, and prosperity in the Horn of Africa and the wider Red Sea region – thus helping preserve and advance its fundamental foreign policy and national security interests.
Ultimately, after years of conflict, instability, and crisis, the Horn of Africa is witnessing encouraging developments. Moving forward, peace and cooperation opens great opportunities for prosperity and better circumstances for ordinary Ethiopians, Eritreans, and others across the region.
The Dubai-based harbor operator is evaluating its strategy and Eritrea could be key
“Eritrea’s strategic location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key shipping lane used by oil tankers & other cargo vessels en route to the Suez Canal, makes it an attractive investment destination.” – CEO, DP World
The Red Sea state of Eritrea may play a key role in DP World Ltd.’s plans in the Horn of Africa, where a dozen ports could be needed to service the region, Chief Executive Officer Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem said.
The Dubai-based state-controlled harbor operator is evaluating its strategy in the region after having its stake in a port in Djibouti — the main trade route for Ethiopia, Africa’s fastest-growing economy — nationalized by the government.
Developing more ports in the Horn, including one it’s already building at Berbera in the self-declared republic of Somaliland, will help boost trade flows to Dubai, Bin Sulayem said in an interview.
Eritrea’s strategic location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key shipping lane used by oil tankers and other cargo vessels en route to the Suez Canal, makes it an attractive investment destination for logistics companies. It’s also a gateway to other nations in the region, the CEO said.
“Eritrea is going to have a major role,” Bin Sulayem said. “We believe that the way we should look at the Horn of Africa is not at Eritrea alone, but add to the equation South Sudan, other parts of Sudan, and Eritrea’s needs, and then the Ethiopian population.”
“That’s the only way out: compensation,” Aboubaker said. “But we believe that they are not interested in money. They want more than money. They want to freeze any maritime infrastructure development on the 354 kilometers of the coast in the entire country for the next 50 years.”
DP World spokespeople Michael Vertigans and Sana Maadad didn’t immediately respond to an emailed request for comment sent on Friday.
DP World is also in arbitration with China Merchants Port Holdings Co. at the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre over the alleged infringement of DP World’s 50-year concession to run the Djibouti terminal, Bin Sulayem said. China Merchants bought a stake in DCT in 2012.
Ethiopia, Somaliland
Elsewhere in the region, DP World is interested in helping develop Kenya’s Mombasa port, and in helping Ethiopia establish a logistics facility, he said.
“Eritrea is going to have a major role” – Bin Sulayem, CEO DP World
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed this year pledged to co-develop four unidentified seaports in Somalia with Somalia’s federal government. While DP World’s involved only in Somaliland and in the Bossaso port in neighboring semi-autonomous Puntland, it will consider more Somali ports if further offers are made, Bin Sulayem said.
Eritrea is normalizing its foreign relations after signing a historic peace deal in July with neighboring Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous nation with 105 million people. The two countries fought a border war two decades ago that claimed as many as 100,000 lives.
DP World will consider what the government’s plans are at the port city of Assab and “will be there like everybody else” if asked to invest, Bin Sulayem said. Eritrean Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel said he couldn’t comment on whether the ports of Assab and Massawa will be opened for tender.
Eritrea may provide an alternative trade route for the region instead of Djibouti, where DP World is in a legal dispute with the government after it nationalized the Doraleh Container Terminal last month. That followed a U.K. tribunal ruling that Djibouti’s cancellation in February of DP World’s contract to run DCT was unlawful.
Dispute Resolution
Djibouti’s government hasn’t approached DP World directly or indirectly with an offer of a settlement, Bin Sulayem said. Djibouti’s ports authority chairman, Aboubaker Omar Hadi, said in an emailed response to questions he met Bin Sulayem in January where they discussed possible compensation, though details of that have yet to be worked out.
The company has been carrying out assessments throughout the region, Bin Sulayem said. He declined to specify how many harbors it’s targeting of the 10 to 12 it estimates the region requires.
Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi told reporters last week in Hargeisa that Ethiopia may use three more Somali ports — Bosaso in Puntland, and Merca and Kismayo in southern Somalia.
Somaliland, which has declared independence from Somalia, hosts a United Arab Emirates military facility at Berbera, though Bin Sulayem said the base won’t have a bearing on its investment plans.
“Whatever the U.A.E. does is to improve trade relations because that is our bread and butter,” Bin Sulayem said. “There is no political agenda of the U.A.E. in Africa. Our agenda is trade.”
Ethiopia and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) signed a historic peace agreement on 21 October in Asmara, ending the 34-year-old insurgency in the country. The document was signed by FM Workneh Gebeyehu and by Admiral Mohammed-Omar Osman, Chairman of ONLF.
After more than three decades of insurgency between Ethiopia and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) rebels from its Somali Region, the two on Sunday signed a peace deal agreeing to end all hostilities and pursue their political obligations through peaceful means.
The ONLF, formed in 1984, had been fighting for the rights of ethnic Somalis living in eastern Ethiopia to self-determination, as well as a bid for secession.
The peace deal was signed in the Eritrean capital Asmara by Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister, Workneh Gebeyehu and the vice-president of the Somali regional state, Mustafa Omer.
“The Ethiopian government and ONLF delegations held productive discussions and reached a historic deal that allows the ONLF to undertake a peaceful political struggle in Ethiopia,” the foreign ministry said.
Ethiopian President Abiy Ahmed, since assuming office in April, promised to deal with ethnic conflicts in the country that have displaced over 2 million people since last year. He has also made attempts to reconcile with several rebel groups in the country.
In July, his administration removed the ONLF from a terror list which prompted the group to declare an indefinite unilateral ceasefire in August.
But what is the genesis of the conflict between Ethiopia and the ONLF?
In 1977, Ethiopia and Somalia got engaged in a territorial conflict over the Ogaden region that is claimed and situated between the two countries.
This territorial dispute got international attention as Ethiopia had the backing of the Soviet Union while Somalia was supported by the United States.
The Border conflict and internal unrest in the Ogaden resumed after Somalia became independent in 1960 led by the Western Somalia Liberation Front of the area who were resisting Ethiopian rule.
Ethiopian leader, Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown in September 1974 by the military council known as the Derg and out of the political confusion that ensued arose many separatist groups who were opposed to the Derg. The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was one of those groups. Made up of Somalis living in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, this group demanded the annexation of the area they controlled to Somalia.
The Derg, by 1977, had gained total control of almost all of Ethiopia, as it suppressed many separatist groups, particularly the WSLF and its supporters. Ethiopia, had, around this time been declared a Marxist state and had been allied with the Soviet Union.
The WSLF, meanwhile, in their fight gained support in terms of weapons and other supplies from the Somali government while the Soviets also supplied their new ally Ethiopia with massive support to the extent of bringing in 15,000 Cuban troops as well as “volunteers” from other communist nations such as Yemen and North Korea when the territorial conflict began. The Somalis, in response, also requested support from the United States, which they received.
When the conflict began in July 1977, the Somali National Army of about 35,000 alongside fifteen thousand WSLF militiamen outnumbered the Ethiopian military but because Ethiopia had superior artillery and air force due to the Soviet support they received, they defeated the Somali Army and the WSLF allies and drove them out.
Peace negotiation between the Ethiopian government representatives and ONLF leaders in Asmara, Eritrea.
At the start of the conflict, Ethiopia controlled 10 per cent of the Ogaden region but by March 1978, it had captured almost all of the Ogaden, pushing the Somalis out of the area.
Accounts state that by the early 1980s, the number of refugees in Somalia from the Ogaden exceeded 1,500,000, most of them women and children.
Since the 1980s, the region has continued to experience periodic unrest, including tensions after the disputed 2005 general elections and the civil unrest in Somalia and Ethiopia’s intervention there in 2006.
Thus, the Ethiopian government has had military presence in the region that is said to contain four trillion cubic feet of gas and oil deposits.
The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which was formed in 1984, has been one of the groups spearheading these periodic insurgencies.
Its massive attack was in April 2007 when its fighters killed about 74 people in an attack on a Chinese-run oil facility. This compelled the Ethiopian government to further crack down on the activities of the ONLF rebels that have claimed lives and caused other human rights abuses.
Following the group’s indefinite unilateral ceasefire in August after their removal from the terror list and Sunday’s peace agreement, the two sides have now agreed to end all hostilities and form a joint committee to discuss the root causes of the conflict.